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Abstract
There is a strong case to be made for thinking that an obscure logic, KR, is better
than classical logic and better than any relevant logic. The argument for KR over
relevant logics is that KR counts disjunctive syllogism valid, and this is the biggest
complaint about relevant logics. The argument for KR over classical logic depends on
the normativity of logic and the paradoxes of implication. The paradoxes of implication
are taken by relevant logicians to justify relevant logic, but considerations on the
normativity of logic show that only some of the paradoxes of implication are genuine.
KR avoids all the genuine paradoxes of implication, unlike classical logic. Overall, KR
avoids the genuine paradoxes of implication and avoids the major objection to relevant
logics. This combination of features provides strong reason to give KR a place in the
conversation about the right logic(s).
Keywords Relevant logic · Paradoxes of implication · KR
1 Introduction
There is a certain obscure logic that deserves much more attention than it has received
so far. I doubt that anyone who is not a logician has ever heard of it, and likely many
logicians have not either. It is what we might call a super relevant logic because it is
stronger than any relevant logic, but weaker than classical logic. The logic is KR, and
there is a strong case to be made in favour of it.
KR was first mentioned in Relevant Logics and Their Rivals as being investigated
independently by A. Abraham and by Routley and Meyer.1 It results from adding
axiom scheme (MECQ),  (¬A ∧ A) → ¬B, to the relevant logic R. Andersen,
1 Routley and Meyer (1982: pp. 378–379).
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Belnap, and Dunn write: “In KR, classical negation and relevant negation are identified.
One’s initial reaction to KR is that it is probably a trivial system, if it doesn’t simply
collapse into classical logic. As we shall see, this reaction could hardly be wider of the
mark.”2 Andersen, Belnap, and Dunn go on to present some features of KR and note
its connection to projective geometry. As far as I can tell, no one has ever advocated
KR for any purpose, and the only significant roles it has played in the literature is
in Urquhart’s results on undecidability and interpolation, and Fallahi’s recent work
on pretabular logics.3 KR also has a semantics that is considerably simpler than the
standard Routley–Meyer semantics for R.4
The case for KR is twofold. One consideration pertains to the paradoxes of material
implication, which provide the central motivation for relevant logics like R.5 I argue
that the debate about whether avoiding the paradoxes of implication provides a good
reason to endorse relevant logic over classical logic rests on a mistake about the
normativity of logic. The mistaken assumption is that if people do not infer according
to a certain pattern, then the correct logic should not count that pattern as valid.
Several decades ago, Gilbert Harman demonstrated that this assumption conflates the
psychological process of inference with the semantic relation of implication. Instead
of the mistaken assumption, I argue that we ought to adopt Greg Restall’s view on
the normativity of logic. However, one unnoticed consequence of Restall’s view is
that some of the paradoxes of implication are not problematic at all, while others are
genuinely problematic. The correct logic ought to avoid only the genuine paradoxes
of implication. It turns out that KR excludes all of them. As such, to adopt R over KR
is to throw out some of the babies with the bathwater.6
Which babies? That is the second consideration in favour of KR: the status of
disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are notorious for rejecting this inference rule,
and the debate about it has been heated. I argue that there are plenty of considerations
in favour of disjunctive syllogism, and no good reason to reject it. As such, disjunctive
syllogism should be a rule of the correct logic or logics.
2 Anderson et al. (1992: p. 350).
3 See Urquhart (1983, 1993, 2017) and Fallahi (2018).
4 See Anderson et al. (1992: p. 350) for details on the semantics for KR and the soundness and completeness
results.
5 Some philosophers and logicians argue for weak relevance logics (e.g., B) from considerations about the
semantic paradoxes, but these are not the focus of this paper; see Beall (2009) for an example.
6 Arguing for a particular logic is a tricky business. There is currently a lively debate about logical plural-
ism—whether multiple distinct logics are equally correct. (See Beall and Restall (2006) and Cook (2010)
for more on logical pluralism.) If logical pluralism is right, then there is no single universal standard for
evaluating deductive arguments. For the most part, considerations for or against logical pluralism are inde-
pendent of the case in favour of KR. My conclusion is: if there is one correct logic, then KR is it, and
if there is not, then KR is among the correct ones. Indeed, there is a better case to be made for KR than
for the logic of relevant implication (the strongest relevant logic, R) or classical logic (C), which are its
two main competitors. There is, of course, a massive literature on intuitionistic logic (I), and the costs and
benefits of adopting it over classical logic. This debate too is independent of the case for KR, which has
a classical negation (in the sense that it obeys excluded middle and double negation elimination), but one
could swap it out for an intuitionistic negation instead. One could intuitionize KR in the same way that one
can intuitionize R; see Dosen (1981). Core logic is similar in that it relevantizes intuitionistic logic; see
Tennant (2017). Intuitionistic KR (IKR?) has been studied in Robles and Méndez (2018). See Robles and
Méndez (2007) for a different approach.
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KR counts disjunctive syllogism valid. Among relevant logicians, the main reason
for rejecting disjunctive syllogism has been that it is used in the derivation of some
of the paradoxes of implication and so is guilty by association.7 However, once one
distinguishes between the genuine paradoxes of implication and the rest, it turns out
that disjunctive syllogism is associated with none of the genuine ones. Thus, the main
obstacle to accepting disjunctive syllogism is illusory.
Overall, the advantage of KR over relevant logics is its inclusion of disjunctive
syllogism, and its benefit over classical logic is that it avoids the genuine paradoxes
of implication. These two factors make KR a better choice than either a relevant logic
or classical logic.
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first section, I introduce relevant logics,
the common argument for them, and the superrelevant logics like KR. I explain how
KR differs from R and CL. The second section concerns the normativity of logic;
in this section, I discuss the views of Gilbert Harman, Florian Steinberger, and Greg
Restall in order to establish which paradoxes of implication are genuine and which
are illusory. In the third section, I offer an argument for KR over classical logic: KR
has none of the genuine paradoxes of implication. In the fourth section, I offer an
argument for KR over R: disjunctive syllogism should be counted valid and the major
reasons given by relevant logicians for thinking it is invalid are not good. Hence, there
is no reason to reject it and plenty of reason to accept it.
Remember, this is only a plea for KR to be part of the conversation. What follows
are good reasons to think it has substantial benefits over its competitors and so should
be taken seriously. However, I do not presume to give a conclusive case. In other words,
KR should be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of various logics in
the philosophical literature. The standards for success in showing that KR should be
part of the conversation are considerably easier to meet than the standards for having
conclusively shown that KR is the best logic.
2 Relevant logics, superrelevant logics, and classical logic
Understanding the relationship between KR, R, and C is the first order of business.
We can begin with relevant logic and the primary argument for it.
2.1 Paradoxes of material implication
Historically, relevant logic developed out of concern for the following paradoxes of
implication; they are valid in classical logic, but they are all invalid in every relevant
logic.8
7 Belnap recalls developing relevant logics from Ackermann’s systems by eliminating disjunctive syllogism
from its inference rules in order to have closer parallel between derivable sequents and conditional theorems.
I return to this consideration in Section Four. See Belnap (1989).
8 See Anderson and Belnap (Anderson and Belnap 1975: pp. 3–5) and Routley and Meyer (1982: pp. 1–10).
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Material Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (MECQ):  (A ∧ ¬ A) → B
Material Ex Falso Quodlibet (MEFQ):  ¬ A → (A → B)
Verum Ex Quodlibet (VEQ):  A → (B ∨ ¬ B)
Positive Paradox (PP):  A → (B → A)
Negative Paradox (NP):  A → (B → B)
Linear Order (LO):  (A → B) ∨ (B → A)
Unrelated Extremes (UE):  (A ∧ ¬ A) → (B ∨ ¬ B)
Each of these is a theorem of classical logic and none of them are theorems of relevant
logic. It is commonly assumed in the debate that they stand or fall together. That
assumption is exactly what I show is false.
If one thinks of the conditional symbol (→) as a model for the conditional con-
struction of English (if …, then __), then one can find instances of these schemata that
are intuitively unacceptable.9 For example, ‘if snow is white, then if grass is green,
snow is white’ is an instance of PP, but to many people, it sounds wrong. Relevant
logics were originally designed to avoid these problems by using a conditional that
does not have the paradoxes of implication as theorems.10
One does not just stipulate that the paradoxes of implication are not valid—one
must formulate a logic in which it is impossible to derive them. There are multiple
ways to achieve this but a natural one is to give up certain inference rules, the most
obvious of which is ex falso quodlibet
(EFQ): A, ¬A  B.
and the related ex contradictione quodlibet
(ECQ): A ∧ ¬A  B.
Of course, it is not easy to eliminate all the axioms and inference rules that can be used
to derive one of the paradoxes of implication without eliminating something people
find intuitively acceptable. For example, one can use the inference rule of disjunctive
syllogism
(DS): A ∨ B, ¬A  B
to derive any arbitrary sentence from a contradiction via what is known as the Lewis
Argument.11 Hence, if the logic is going to exclude (EFQ), then it has to exclude
(DS) as well.12 That is exactly why relevant logicians reject DS.13 Keep in mind that
in what follows, by ‘disjunctive syllogism’ and ‘DS’, I refer to the above inference
9 I follow relevance logicians in assuming that the logical connectives should faithfully model their natural
language counterparts. See Mares (2004: pp. 125–160) for discussion.
10 See Tennant (2017) for an alternative motivation that emphasizes deducibility.
11 Lewis and Langford (1932).
12 This assumes that one does not follow Tennant (2017) in rejecting the structural rule of transitivity,
which allows one to retain (DS) but not (EFQ). Comparison of KR with Tennant’s non-transitive systems
is clearly needed, but my focus here is to get KR in the discussion before engaging in a complex defense
like this.
13 See Dunn and Restall (2002: pp. 30–34) and Mares (2004: p. 175) for further discussion of those who
agree with Anderson and Belnap that one ought to reject DS because one rejects EFQ.
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Fig. 1 Familiar relevant logics (this diagram is based on one in Read (1989: 60), with some differences;
see Read (1989) for discussion. Logics like Core logic—see Tennant (2017)—are not included because
this plea for KR focuses on showing that it is better than the traditional relevance logics like R. A close
examination of the respective merits of KR and Classical Core Logic (as relevantizations of classical logic)
is more complicated and has to be saved for future work.)
rule—we will see in a bit that these terms are interpreted in different ways so one must
be careful to avoid confusion; more on this point later.
Relevant logicians aim to formulate a logic that is faithful to our reasoning pro-
cesses, and to that end, they reject any inference rules that could be used to derive one
of the paradoxes of implication. Their diagnosis of what has gone wrong in the rea-
soning for one of the paradoxes is that it involves a step where the relevant connection
between the premises and the conclusion of an argument or between the antecedent
and the consequent of a conditional is missing. As such, they think that (EFQ), where
anything follows from a contradiction, is a mistake. As a result, they reject (DS) as
well, which seems to many people like an intuitively acceptable inference rule [if only
it could not be used to derive (EFQ)].
2.2 Relevant logics, superrelevant logics, and KR
In this section, I present some details of KR and place it in the context of the family
of relevant logics and the logics that are stronger than R (and thus not relevant logics)
but weaker than classical logic. Following Dunn and Restall, we can call these super-
relevant logics, not because they are inspired by some relation, super-relevant, but
rather because they are stronger than any of the relevant logics.14
Before we can appreciate my preferred logic, we need to get a clearer picture of
the super-relevant logics. Consider the following figure that shows just a few of those
commonly discussed:
In Figure 1, the logic, B, on the far left, is relatively weak and the logics increase in
strength to the right. I begin by focusing on axiomatic systems of R and its extensions
(issues related to natural deduction are discussed below). In an axiomatic system, a
derivation consists of sequence of formulas where each one is either an axiom or
14 Dunn and Restall (2002). Routley and Meyer (1982) call them para-relevant logics. What counts as a
relevant logic is controversial, but many use the variable sharing property (e.g., antecedents and consequents
of conditional theorems share a propositional variable); see Section Four for more discussion.
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follows from earlier ones by an inference rule.15 A logic is a set of sequents, where a
sequent is a pair consisting of a set of sentences and a sentence.
Now we need to add to this diagram the superrelevant logics, which belong in the
region between R and C. Begin with a standard version of R16:
Axiom Schemata:
(R1) A → A
(R2) (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C))
(R3) A → ((A → B) → B)
(R4) (A → (A → B)) → (A → B)
(R5) (A ∧ B) → A
(R6) (A ∧ B) → B
(R7) A → (A ∨ B)
(R8) B → (A ∨ B)
(R9) ((A → B) ∧ (A → C)) → (A → (B ∧ C))
(R10) (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) → ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
(R11) ¬¬A → A
(R12) (A → ¬ B) → (B → ¬ A)
Rules:
(∧Intro) A, B  A ∧ B
(MP) A → B, A  B
It will be helpful to consider Eric Schechter’s investigation into the results of adding
some paradoxes of implication to R.17 First, if we add positive paradox:
(PP) A → (B → A),
to R, the result is CL, classical logic—all the other paradoxes of implication are
provable once PP is added to R. Second, if we add the mingle principle:
(M) A → (A → A),
the result is the logic RM. In this logic, PP is not valid, but both LO and UE are valid.
Stronger than RM, but not as strong as classical logic, is RM3, which results from
adding M and the following formula:
(3)  A ∨ (A → B)
to R. M is obviously valid in RM3, and LO and UE are as well. Fourth, if only linear
order:
(LO)  (A → B) ∨ (B → A),
15 See Anderson and Belnap (1975), Anderson et al. (1992), Mares (2004), and Schechter (2004) for a list
of the axioms of R.
16 Mares (2004: pp. 208–209).
17 Schechter (2004).
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Fig. 2 Relevant and superrelevant logics
is added to R, the result is the logic RLO. In RLO, neither PP nor M are valid, but UE
is valid. Finally, when UE is added to R, the result is the logic RUE. In RUE, PP, M,
LO are all invalid.18
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the four super-relevant logics discussed
so far (i.e., RM3, RM, RLO, and RUE).
It turns out that adding material ex falso quodlibet, material disjunctive syllogism,
or verum ex quodlibet:
(MECQ)  (¬A ∧ A) → ¬B
(MDS)  (¬ A ∧ (A ∨ B)) → B
(VEQ)  A → (B ∨ ¬ B)
to R results in KR.
The place of KR among the superrelevant logics is justified by the following facts
(proofs in footnotes).
1. (MECQ), (MDS), and (VEQ) are equivalent in R.19
2. (MECQ), (MDS), and (VEQ) are not theorems of RM3.20
3. (MECQ), (MDS), and (VEQ) are not theorems of RM.21
4. (MECQ), (MDS), and (VEQ) are not theorems of RLO.22
5. (UE) is a theorem of KR.23
6. (LO), (PP), (NP), (MECQ), and (M) are not theorems of KR.24
18 For proofs of all these results, see Schechter (2004).
19 It is trivial to derive (VEQ) from (MECQ) and vice versa, and to derive (MDS) from (MECQ) and vice
versa using only inference rules of R.
20 Let MRM3 be the matrix characteristic of the logic RM3 with truth values 0, 1, and ½ where 1 and ½ are
designated; see Priest (2001). Let A and B be distinct propositional variables and let  be an interpretation
defined in MRM3 such that (A)=½ and (B)=0. Then, ((A∧ ¬A) → B)  0. Because (MECQ) is
equivalent to (VEQ) and to (MDS), neither (VEQ) nor (MDS) is valid in RM3 either.
21 RM3 is an extension of RM; hence the result holds for RM.
22 RM3 is an extension of RLO; hence the result holds for RLO.
23 It is trivial to derive (UE) from (MECQ) using only inference rules of R.
24 Using the standard Routley–Meyer ternary semantics for KR [see Anderson et al. (1992: p. 350)].
Consider the KR-frame where D  {0, 1} and R  {<0, 0, 0>, <0, 1, 1>, <1, 0, 1>, <1, 1, 0>, <1, 1, 1>}.
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Fig. 3 Logics, theorems, and non-theorems
From these results, we acquire a decent understanding of the super-relevant logics
and the place of KR among them. And Figure 3 illustrates which of the paradoxes of
material implication are derivable in which logics.
2.3 KR
So far we have seen an axiomatization of KR, how it differs from R (one of the most
popular relevant logics), how it differs from classical logic, and how it is related to the
other super-relevant logics. We can say that KR is stronger than any relevant logic, but
it is weaker than classical logic. All the arguments classified as valid by R are valid in
KR too, but not vice versa. And all the arguments classified as valid by KR are valid
in C too, but not vice versa.
3 The normativity of logic
Logic is often thought to be normative in the sense that it determines how one ought
to reason or how one may reason. For example, it seems right to say that if some
argument is valid, then it is permissible to reason from the premises of that argument
to its conclusion. However, it turns out that the link between the validity of an argument
and what people may or ought to do in reasoning is complex and subtle. In this section,
I present the main argument in favour of relevance logic, show that it is an appeal to
the normativity of logic, and present several problems for this sort of appeal.
Footnote 24 continued
There is KR-model on this KR-frame such that 0  A, ¬B, and 1  ¬A, B. Because 0  A → B and 0
 B → A, it follows that 0  (A → B) ∨ (B → A). Thus, (LO) is not a theorem of KR. Using the same
KR-frame, a countermodel for (PP) is 0  A → (B → A), 0  A, and 1  ¬A, B. On the same KR-frame, a
countermodel for (NP) is 0  A → (B → B), 0  ¬B, and 1  A, B. On the same KR-frame, a countermodel
for (MECQ) is 0  ¬A → (A → B), 0  ¬A, and 1  A, ¬B. And finally, a countermodel for (M) is 0  A
→ (A → A), 0  ¬A, and 1  A.
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3.1 The argument for relevant logic
All the most famous arguments for relevant logic are based on the paradoxes of impli-
cation, and these arguments are textbook examples of an appeal to the normativity of
logic.25 Here is Graham Priest on the what he calls the “anomaly” that in classical
logic, anything follows from a contradiction [i.e., (ECQ)]:
By a process that does not fall short of indoctrination most logicians have now
had their sensibilities dulled to these glaring anomalies. However, this is possible
only because logicians have also forgotten that logic is a normative subject: it
is supposed to provide an account of correct reasoning. When seen in this light
the full force of these absurdities can be appreciated.26
The line of argument is clear: because logic is supposed to capture correct reasoning,
and we do not infer anything from a contradiction, logic should exclude (ECQ). For
example, imagine a person who finds herself holding contradictory beliefs. Upon
discovering this, is she likely to start randomly inferring lots of beliefs from this
contradiction? Unless she is a particularly batty person, no, she will not. Instead, when
one realizes that one holds contradictory beliefs, one usually attempts to eliminate the
contradiction by belief revision. People simply do not behave as if anything follows
from a contradiction.
Relevant logicians conclude that the correct logic ought not permit (ECQ). For
example, Anderson and Belnap claim that (ECQ) is “self-evidently preposterous,”
their reason being that we do not and should not infer anything from a contradiction,
our theory ought to not have inference rules permitting or obligating us to do so.27
Edwin Mares and Robert Meyer make this kind of appeal as well.28 The central point
for these relevant logicians is that (ECQ) should not be an inference rule because it is
not something we should follow.
Relevant logicians make the same appeal to common inference patterns when reject-
ing other inference rules that can be used to derive paradoxes of implication. For
example, Mares discusses the rule form of (VEQ) and argues,
Thus, if we set p to mean ‘my dog barks at rubbish collectors’ and q to mean ‘it
is raining in Bolivia right now’ we find out that the inference
My dog barks at rubbish collectors
∴ Either it is raining in Bolivia right now or it is not.
25 This plea for KR engages only with the canonical arguments for relevant logic. New and fascinating
arguments for relevant logics have recently been given by Tennant (2017: pp. 40–44) and Beall (2018). Beall
in particular takes care to make the assumptions of his argument consistent with Harman’s point, which
I emphasize in this section. However, Beall’s argument does depend on his shrieking manoeuvre, which
leaves it open to criticisms like those in Scharp (2018). Further discussion and comparison is desirable, but
beyond the scope of this paper.
26 Priest (1979: p. 297). Although Priest is not himself a relevance logician, he is arguing for a paraconsistent
logic, i.e., one that rejects (ECQ). Quoted in Steinberger (2016).
27 Anderson and Belnap (1975: p. 165).
28 Mares and Meyer (2001).
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is valid. Since the premise is true, the argument is also sound. But, … it is a very
bad argument.29
And, later, Mares writes about this same inference rule, “But according to our pre-
theoretical logical intuitions, it does not seem that we are justified in inferring any
logical truth from any proposition.”30 Again, we see relevant logic justified by an
appeal to our intuitions about which ways of reasoning are right and which are not.
Relevant logicians argue that if such and such is not good reasoning, then the
associated argument is invalid. This argument clearly appeals to one direction of the
link between logical consequence and good reasoning.
3.2 Harman, MacFarlane, and Steinberger on the normativity of logic
I am going to argue that the relevant logicians’ argument for relevant logic is unsound.
However, to do so, I appeal to several developments in the normativity of logic debate.
The first major move is Gilbert Harman’s celebrated criticism of the orthodox view
on the normativity of logic. Harman distinguished between inference, a mental process
and implication, a relation between propositions.31 When one confuses these notions,
one might think that inference rules are laws of thought. If one thinks of inference
rules as laws of thought, then one might accept the following principle: if one believes
the premises of a valid inference, then one should (or is permitted to) believe the
conclusion. However, Harman argues that inference rules do not govern the process
of inference—they do not determine how one may or ought to infer. That is, inference
rules neither permit one to infer in a certain way nor obligate one to infer in a certain
way. Rather, inference rules encode the relation of implication between propositions.
Consider the inference rule modus ponens: p, p → q  q. Assume, for a moment,
that inference rules dictate what one ought to believe.32 If one believes both p and
p → q then one would be wrong or mistaken if one did not also believe q. Imagine
that a person came to hold both the belief that p and the belief that p → q at very
different times in her life such that she never really considered both beliefs in the same
moment.33 It does not seem that she has done anything wrong by not also holding
the belief that q. It is important to make clear that there is not enough time in the day
for one to determine and come to hold all the beliefs that follow (via inference rules)
from the combinations of all the other beliefs one already holds. Inference rules do not
dictate what one ought to believe. Therefore, the inference rule modus ponens does
not tell us that if one believes p and p → q then one also ought to believe q.
29 Mares (2004: p. 4).
30 Mares (2004: p. 8).
31 See Harman (1986). I acknowledge that the terms ‘inference’, ‘implication’, ‘entailment’ are often used
to mean different things by different people even within the same debate. While it obviously would be far
easier if philosophers were more consistent on these matters, this is (sadly) not something that I have any
control over. Moreover, it is not my point here. In the text, I point to a conceptual distinction that I think is
crucial for the discussion at hand, but what particular terms one uses to mark the distinction is not.
32 See Mares (2004) for example.
33 Throughout this paper, I use expressions like ‘I hold the belief p’ as shorthand for “I believe the content
of the sentence that ‘p’ stands for”.
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Instead, one might think that inference rules dictate what one may believe. For the
example of modus ponens, it would follow that one who holds the two beliefs (p and
p → q) is permitted to infer q. But, what if the person already holds the belief that
¬q? If we understand inference rules as functioning this way, then modus ponens
would permit one to believe both q and ¬q. Clearly, the mere fact that one comes to
believe p and p → q does not, by itself, give permission also to believe q—if it did,
there could be cases in which inference rules provide permission to hold contradictory
beliefs. Inference rules dictate neither what one is permitted to believe nor what one is
obligated to believe. That is, despite their name, inference rules are not rules governing
our mental process of inference.
The second major advance in reflection on the normativity of logic comes from John
MacFarlane. He suggested that we examine the extent to which logic is normative by
reflecting on bridge principles that connect logical consequence with the normative
arena.34 A bridge principle is any principle that successfully links these two domains
in a way that upholds the significance of logical consequence for norms governing
human reasoning. MacFarlane also provides a handy categorization scheme for bridge
principles that cover a wide range of options.
The general form of all the bridge principles MacFarlane considers is as follows:
If P1, …, Pn  Q, then ϕ( P1, …, Pn, Q)
The overall form is a conditional. The antecedent is about logical consequence and the
consequent is some claim about the propositions related in the antecedent. The nature
of this claim varies in three possible ways: scope, normativity, and valance.
Scope: (C) Narrow scope ‘ought’, only for the consequent: if A, then O(B)
(W) Wide scope ‘ought’, for the whole conditional: O(if A, then B)
(B) Both antecedent and consequent bound by ‘ought’: if O(A), then
O(B)
Normativity: (o) ought
(p) permission
(r) defeasible reason
Valence: (+) positive—obligation to believe
(−) negative—obligation to not disbelieve
There are twelve possible combinations and so twelve possible bridge principles. For
example:
(Co+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to believe Q.
(Co-) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to not-disbelieve Q.
are two of the twelve.
In Florian Steinberger’s recent paper, “Explosion and the Normativity of Logic,”
he argues in detail that once one thinks about bridge principles in the way MacFarlane
suggests, none of them justify the claim that (ECQ) is invalid. As Steinberger recon-
structs the relevant logician’s argument against (ECQ), it needs a bridge principle that
is both plausible and strong enough to support the desired conclusion [i.e., that (ECQ)
34 MacFarlane (2004).
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is invalid or should be excluded from any legitimate logic]. Steinberger then argues
that none of the bridge principles in MacFarlane’s space of possibilities satisfies both
criteria. Here is the argument against (EFQ) that Steinberger reconstructs on behalf of
the relevantist:
(1) (ECQ) is valid.
(2) S believes each member of an inconsistent set of propositions .
(3) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to believe Q.
(4) Even if S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition Q whatsoever is
entailed by it (courtesy of ECQ), there are Qs such that S ought not to believe Q.
(5)   Q for some patently unacceptable Q that S ought not to believe (from 1 and
2).
(6) S ought not to believe Q (from 4).
(7) S ought to believe Q (from 2, 3 and 5 via modus ponens).
(8) Contradiction (from 6 and 7).
(9) (ECQ) is invalid (from 1 by reductio). 
Call this the normative argument.35 A problem with the normative argument is that
one might reject (3) instead of (1) because there are independent reasons to reject (3).
(3) is a bridge principle that links up logical consequence with some normative aspect
of human activity.
Steinberger provides us with not only a precise and detailed objection to the rele-
vant logician’s argument against ex falso, but also a general schema for making the
same kind of point in all the other cases. That is, we can apply Steinberger’s normative
argument to the rest of the paradoxes of implication. Moreover, in the course of giv-
ing his argument, Steinberger gives us a comprehensive assessment of all the bridge
principles in MacFarlane’s categorization scheme.
(Co+), (Co−), (Cp+), (Cp−) are implausible in that they fall prey to Harman’s
objections.
(Cr+), (Cr−) are too weak in that they do not make the normative argument sound.
(Wo+), (Wo−), (Wp+), (Wp−), (Wr+), and (Wr−) are too weak.
(Bo+), (Bo−), (Bp+), (Bp−) are too weak.
(Br+), and (Br−) are implausible and too weak.
Steinberger’s conclusion is that the relevant logicians’ normative argument for rele-
vance logic is unsound; there is no way to fill in the bridge principle that is plausible
and strong enough to make the argument go through.
3.3 A normative necessary condition for validity
Harman inspires us to question the sense in which logic is normative by criticizing the
dominant view on the connection between validity and normativity at the time. This
turned out to be just one bridge principle (Co+) among many, as MacFarlane pointed
out. And Steinberger reconstructed one criticism of (ECQ) and showed that it does
not go through for any of MacFarlane’s bridge principles.
35 See Steinberger (2016).
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However, there is another way to use bridge principles in the discussion about the
normativity of logic: they state necessary conditions for validity. For example, (Co+),
the bridge principle Harman originally criticized, is:
(Co+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to believe Q.
All the bridge principles we have seen are conditionals with a logical consequence
claim as its antecedent and a claim about the normativity of some human states or
processes as its consequent. (Co+), for example, links logical consequence and what
ought to be believed. Of course, we have good reasons from Harman to think that
(Co+) is false. But there are other more plausible bridge principles that do provide
substantive necessary conditions on logical consequence. Like any necessary condi-
tion, they cannot be used to show that some entailment holds, but it can be used to
show that some purported entailment fails to hold.
In what follows, I focus on a particularly popular bridge principle that seems plau-
sible to me as well.36 Consider what Greg Restall proposes in the following passage:
To take an argument to be valid does not mean that when one asserts the premises
one should also assert the conclusion (that way lies madness, or at least, making
many assertions). No, to take an argument to be valid involves (at least as a
part) the commitment to take the assertion of the premises to stand against the
denial of the conclusion. In general, we can think of logical consequence as
governing positions involving statements asserted and those denied. Logical
validity governs positions in the following way:
If A  B, then the position consisting of asserting A and denying B clashes.
If B deductively follows from A, and I assert A and deny B, I have made a mistake.37
Inset in the quote is a bridge principle. Its antecedent is a single-premise entailment,
and its consequent pertains to speech acts. We can generalize it in two ways: (i) to
cover propositional attitudes as well, and (ii) to include multipremise deductions. In
what follows, I use the term ‘acceptance’ as a propositional attitude associated with
sincere assertion (one could also use ‘belief’, but ‘acceptance’ is more common in the
logical literature) and ‘rejection’ as a propositional attitude associated with sincere
denial.38
Restall’s bridge principle is very similar to the following bridge principle from
MacFarlane:
(Wo−) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then it ought to be that: if S believes the Pi, S does not
disbelieve Q.
I think it is more accurate to the Restall quote to formulate the consequent as a wide
scope ‘ought not’ over a conjunction, like this:
36 Although many assume that Harman was purely skeptical about the normativity of logic, he does offer
something very much like what Restall suggests in the following quote; see Harman (1986: ch. 2).
37 Restall (2013: p. 83). I have removed Restall’s use/mention convention in this quote.
38 One might think that to reject that p is just to accept that not p (and to deny that p is to assert that not p),
but this claim is incompatible with many non-classical logics. For example, the intuitionist rejects the law
of excluded middle, but does not accept its negation. Likewise, the dialetheist accepts the liar sentence and
its negation, but does not reject either of them.
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(Restall) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then it ought to be that not: S believes the Pi and S
disbelieves Q.
If one could replace logical equivalents inside ‘ought’ operators, then (Wo-) and
(Restall) would be equivalent, but there are good reasons to think that such moves
are questionable.39
We can use (Restall) as a necessary condition for an argument being valid. If
the consequent of (Restall) is false for some particular case, then that is not a valid
argument. In other words, if for some sentences P1, …, Pn and Q, it is permissible
that S believes all the Pi and S disbelieves Q, then Q is not a logical consequence of
P1, …, Pn. It is exactly this sort of argument I propose in the next section.
I am not going to argue for (Restall) except to say that it holds up well under
scrutiny, as in Steinberger’s analysis. There is good reason to think that other bridge
principles are also plausible, but thinking through their implications is beyond the
scope of this paper.40 Remember, this a plea for KR: there are good reasons to think
that KR should be taken seriously. It is reasonable to appeal to a popular and plausible
bridge principle to help make that case.
So far, I have provided some background on KR and argued that the primary argu-
ment for relevant logics involves a fallacy. I also advocated a particular way of thinking
about the normativity of logic encoded in (Restall). Now we put these considerations
to work.
4 KR is better than C
KR is better than classical logic because KR has none of the genuine paradoxes of
implication, although KR does have some illusory paradoxes of implication.
It turns out that some of the paradoxes of implication, like (ECQ) are implausible
when substituted in for (Restall), but others are not. For (ECQ), imagine an explicit
contradiction, ¬A ∧ A, as a premise and any sentence, B, as the conclusion of the
argument in question. Now we ask ourselves about the consequent of (Restall) in this
case. We ask: is it permissible that: S believes ¬A ∧ A and S disbelieves B? The
answer is no, regardless of what B is. The reason is that it is impermissible to believe
the contradiction, regardless of whatever else is going on. Therefore, in the instance
under consideration, the consequent of (Restall) is true. We need a case that makes
the consequent of (Restall) false to be able to use it at all. One might wonder whether
there are any cases like this. There are.
Can we find a paradox of implication that would make the consequent of (Restall)
false? If so, then we would have a good reason for saying it is invalid. Of course, each
of the paradoxes of implication is formulated as a theorem rather than as an inference
rule, but the case of an inference rule like (ECQ) and a theorem like (MECQ), there is
an obvious connection that needs to be explored. If an inference rule is valid in some
logic but the associated theorem invalid in that logic, then that logic cannot deem
conditional proof valid in a natural deduction system, which is a serious cost. Yes,
39 See McNamara (2010) for a survey.
40 See Steinberger (2017) for a discussion.
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some of the weaker relevant logics reject conditional proof (e.g., B), but there is strong
intuitive support for it.41 Moreover, any logic we are considering that includes modus
ponens cannot include a conditional theorem but exclude the associated inference rule.
Therefore, if we can show that the associated inference rule should not be deemed valid,
then the theorem in question should not be deemed valid either.42 Below are the results
for the paradoxes of implication.
(MECQ),  (A ∧ ¬ A) → B. In applying (Restall), the essential issue is whether
it is a mistake to believe A ∧ ¬ A and not believe B. Yes it is. It is always a mistake
because it is always a mistake to believe A ∧ ¬ A.43 Therefore, (MECQ) meets the
necessary condition laid down by (Restall). It is not a genuine paradox.
(MEFQ)  ¬ A → (A → B). Is it a mistake to believe not A and not believe if A
then B? No. For example, it is not a mistake to believe that 0=0 and not believe that if
00 then snow is white. Therefore, in the case of (MEFQ), the consequent of (Restall)
is false. Hence, we have good reason to think that (MEFQ) should be excluded from
any acceptable logic. This is our first clear example of a principle that fails to meet
the necessary condition on validity laid down by (Restall). It is a genuine paradox.
(VEQ),  A → (B ∨ ¬ B). Is it a mistake to believe A and not believe B ∨ ¬ B?
Yes. From the beginning, we have been ignoring issues associated with intuitionism.
This plea for KR consists entirely in showing that KR is superior to classical logic and
that it is superior to relevant logic. Both R and C include excluded middle as theorem.
As such, given the background assumptions in play for us, it is always a mistake to
not believe B ∨ ¬ B. Therefore, (VEQ) meets the necessary condition laid down by
(Restall). It is not a genuine paradox.
(PP),  A → (B → A). Is it a mistake to believe A and not believe if B then A?
No. For example, it is not a mistake to believe that grass is green and to not believe
that if snow is white, then grass is green. Therefore, (PP) fails to meet the necessary
condition for validity expressed by (Restall). Consequently, (PP) should be excluded
from any acceptable logic. It is a genuine paradox.
(NP),  A → (B → B). Is it a mistake to believe A and not believe if B then B? Yes.
It is always a mistake to not believe if A then A. Therefore, (NP) meets the necessary
condition laid down by (Restall). It is not a genuine paradox.
(LO),  (A → B) ∨ (B → A). Is it a mistake to not believe if A then B or if B then
A? Yes. Because this principle is a disjunction, it is the only one that is not associated
with some non-trivial inference rule. However, to evaluate this one we do not need
to evaluate a nested conditional. Instead, it is easy to come up with an example like:
either if grass is green then snow is white, or if snow is white then grass is green.
There is no mistake at all in rejecting this disjunction. Therefore, (LO) fails to meet
the necessary condition. Consequently, (LO) should be excluded from any acceptable
logic. It is a genuine paradox.
41 It was Belnap and Anderson’s original reason to prefer the relevant logic E over Ackermann’s systems;
see Belnap (1989).
42 See Anderson and Belnap’s “Grammatical Propaedeutic” in Anderson and Belnap (1975: pp. 473–493)
for an influential discussion of implication and entailment.
43 Dialetheism is not an option under consideration in this paper; if dialtheism is required to defend relevant
logic, then that is a massive cost for relevant logic given the myriad worries about dialetheism.
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(UE),  (A ∧ ¬ A) → (B ∨ ¬ B). Is it a mistake to believe A ∧ ¬ A and not believe
if B ∨ ¬B? Yes. It is always a mistake to believe A ∧ ¬ A and it is always a mistake
to not believe B ∨ ¬B. Therefore, (UE) meets the necessary condition laid down by
(Restall). It is not a genuine paradox.
Overall, the results of this inquiry into the normative argument with Steinberger’s
bridge principle are mixed. Some of the paradoxes of implication are genuine and
should be excluded from any legitimate logic, while others are illusory and may be
included in legitimate logics. The results are summarized below:
(MECQ)  (A ∧ ¬ A) → B Illusory—may be included in legitimate logics
(MEFQ)  ¬ A → (A → B) Genuine—must be excluded from legitimate logics
(VEQ)  A → (B ∨ ¬ B) Illusory—may be included in legitimate logics
(PP)  A → (B → A) Genuine—must be excluded from legitimate logics
(NP)  A → (B → B) Illusory—may be included in legitimate logics
(LO)  (A → B) ∨ (B → A) Genuine—must be excluded from legitimate logics
(UE)  (A ∧ ¬ A) → (B ∨ ¬ B) Illusory—may be included in legitimate logics
Overall, (MEFQ), (PP), and (LO) are the genuine paradoxes of material implication
and the relevant logicians were right about them: they really ought to be excluded from
any legitimate logic. However, the rest are illusory. They are not paradoxical at all and
so relevant logicians were wrong about them. It is permissible for any legitimate logic
to count these principles as valid.44
I am not the first to draw a substantive distinction among the paradoxes of material
implication. Indeed, Anderson, Belnap, and Dunn write:
To those who have taken the trouble to read the literature on relevance logic rather
than fulminate against it, it has been a familiar fact since the early 70s that there
are two conceptually distinct classes of “paradoxes of material implication.”
The archetype of the first class (paradox of consistency) is (A ∧ ¬ A) → B. The
archetype of the second (paradox of relevance) is A → (B → A). It is easy to
devise systems of entailment that omit one but not the other.45
This distinction gets mentioned occasionally in the literature but rarely, and the two
classifications are never discussed in detail.46
One problem for the view expressed in the quotation is how to draw the distinction
between paradoxes of consistency and paradoxes of relevance. (MECQ) and (PP)
are mentioned explicitly, so they are easy. The following seems like a reasonable
classification, but there is no explicit classification as far as I know.
44 Notice that, although (Restall) is only a necessary condition for logical consequence, I have used it
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the genuineness of a paradox of implication. That is,
if a formula expressing a putative paradox of implication meets the (Restall) condition—the instance is
true—then it is illusory. If it fails to meet the (Restall) condition, then it is genuine.
45 Anderson et al. (1992: p. 249). They suggest that KR includes all the paradoxes of consistency and none
of the paradoxes of relevance, but they never state this claim explicitly.
46 See Robles and Méndez (2007) and Urquhart (2017) for example.
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(MECQ)  (A ∧ ¬ A) → B Consistency
(MEFQ)  ¬ A → (A → B) Both?
(VEQ)  A → (B ∨ ¬ B) Consistency
(PP)  A → (B → A) Relevance
(NP)  A → (B → B) Consistency
(LO)  (A → B) ∨ (B → A) Relevance
(UE)  (A ∧ ¬ A) → (B ∨ ¬ B) Consistency
One problem is how to classify (MEFQ).47 It seems very much like (MECQ), which is
a paradox of consistency. But it also looks like a paradox of relevance in that it allows
one to derive an irrelevant conditional via modus ponens from any negated formula.
Hence, I have listed it as both. Notice that this classification lines up pretty well with
classification above of these into genuine and illusory based on (Restall). Indeed the
(Restall) classification is more precise since it has an explicit test.
And now for the ultimate question: are there any logics that exclude (MEFQ),
(PP), (LO)? Yes! One of them is KR! The fact that classical logic counts the genuine
paradoxes of implication as valid and KR does not constitutes the primary reason for
thinking that KR is better than classical logic. KR does a better job of respecting the
normativity of logic, at least the link between validity and normativity that is expressed
by (Restall). In other words, one should choose KR over classical logic because KR is
compatible with (Restall) and classical logic is not. Of course, all the relevant logics
are compatible with (Restall) too. They avoid all the genuine paradoxes of implication
as well, but they exclude far more of classical logic than KR does. We shall visit the
other side of the argument and see why KR is superior to relevant logics in the next
section.
Consider first an objection to my case in favour of KR over classical logic. This
objection comes from John Burgess, who, in 1981, noted that one might think relevant
logicians are guilty of conflating inference with implication. He quotes Harman making
such a claim:
By reasoning or inference I mean a process by which one changes one’s view,
adding some things and subtracting others. There is another use of the term ‘infer-
ence’ to refer to what I will call ‘argument’, consisting in premises, intermediate
steps, and a conclusion. It is sometimes said that each step of an argument should
follow from the premises or prior steps in accordance with a ‘rule of inference’.
I prefer to say ‘rule of implication’, since the relevant rules do not say how
one may modify one’s views in various contexts. Nor is there a different direct
connection between rules of logical implication and principles of inference. We
cannot say, for example, that one may infer anything one sees to be logically
implied by one’s prior beliefs. Clearly one should not clutter up one’s mind with
many of the obvious consequences of things one believes.
Furthermore, it may happen that one discovers that one’s beliefs are logically incon-
sistent and therefore logically imply everything. Obviously, one ought not to respond
47 Another problem is that (PP) and (NP) are logically equivalent (in R, KR, and classical logic). Hence,
no extension of R can exclude one but not the other.
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to such a discovery by believing as much as one can. Some philosophers and logicians
[the reference is to Anderson and Belnap] have imagined that the remedy here is a
new logic in which logical contradictions do not logically imply everything. But this
is to miss the point that logic is not directly a theory of reasoning at all.48
However, Burgess dismisses this kind of objection in this paper.
Burgess considers the two readings of logic (i.e., the inference reading vs. the
implication reading) as subjective (or psychological) and objective (or ontological).
Then, he gives evidence that Anderson and Belnap presuppose the implication reading
as their preferred reading of relevant logics (they focus on E and R primarily).49 I
agree with Burgess’ interpretation—that is how Anderson and Belnap intend their
logic to be interpreted. However, their arguments for the superiority of their logic over
classical logic presuppose an inference reading (or psychological reading in Burgess’
sense)—consider the evidence Anderson and Belnap provide (see Sect. 2.1). I do
not claim that they intend a psychological reading; they do not. Burgess is correct
about that. My argument is that the interpretation Anderson and Belnap give of their
own logic (the objective one) is incompatible with the evidence they give for it (a
psychological one). Moreover, this seems like the right way to interpret Harman’s
point. It is not the case that relevant logicians intend the psychological reading of their
claims—so, it seems like Burgess’ quick dismissal is based on a misinterpretation.
Furthermore, this issue goes beyond the point made in the quote. When one con-
siders the kind of evidence that would support the objective interpretation—under the
Steinberger bridge principle—it does not support classical logic. Instead, it supports
something weaker, like KR. That does not seem to be an option that is even on Burgess’
radar.
Here is another common objection: All the relevant logicians cited so far have been
saying that their intuition is that certain implications do not hold (e.g., MECQ). This
interpretation is more charitable and then the dispute between a defender of KR and a
relevant logician is just a clash of intuitions about which sequents are logically valid.
My reply: If one looks back at each of the quotes above (and there are many more
in the literature as well), one sees the relevant logician first citing considerations about
what which ways of changing our beliefs would be reasonable or unreasonable. Then
the relevant logician concludes that the associated implication is invalid. This is exactly
the “no inference, no implication” fallacy I diagnose above.
Still, even if one rejects this diagnosis of where the relevant logicians arguments go
wrong, it is crucial to remember that this section is not about preferring KR over R (that
is the next section). It is about preferring KR over classical logic. The reason given
is that KR avoids the genuine paradoxes of implication, but classical logic does not.
Even a relevant logician can accept this argument. The primary case against relevant
logic and for KR has nothing to with Harman’s point. So even if one rejects the
interpretation of Harman or the criticism of relevant logicians’ arguments for relevant
logic, the primary case for KR stands.
48 This unpublished writing of Harman’s is quoted in Burgess (1981: p. 103).
49 Burgess (1981: pp. 103–104).
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5 KR is better than R
It might be tempting to think that there is an argument for KR over R on the basis of
the illusory paradoxes of implication. However, this is a mistake. There is no pressure
to include the illusory paradoxes of implication in a logic. They may be included, but
it is a mistake to think they must be included.50
Instead, the case for KR over R rests on the fact that KR includes disjunctive
syllogism, R does not, there is no good argument for excluding disjunctive syllogism,
and there is good reason for a logic to include it.
The rejection of DS is often thought of as “the most notorious feature of relevant
logic.”51 Relevant logicians J. Michael Dunn and Greg Restall remark that it is
typically the hardest thing to swallow concerning relevant logics. One starts off
with some pleasant motivations about relevant implication and using subscripts
to keep track of whether a hypothesis has actually been used, and then one
comes to the point where one says ‘and of course we have to give up disjunctive
syllogism’ and one loses one’s audience.52
Similarly, Mares writes:
The fact that disjunctive syllogism cannot be added to relevant logic is a prob-
lem. The original point of introducing relevant logic was to provide an intuitive
characterization of deductive inference. But we use disjunctive syllogism all
the time. … In short, disjunctive syllogism would seem to be one of our key
deductive tools. So it looks like we have a problem.53
Obviously, this feature is commonly thought to be undesirable.
The fact is that going without disjunctive syllogism is probably the most unsavoury
and counterintuitive aspects of relevant logic. This fact speaks volumes about the shear
intuitive appeal of disjunctive syllogism. It is not one of the paradoxes of implication
and so the main case in favour of relevant logic has nothing to do with disjunctive
syllogism. It is such an important topic only because relevant logicians give it up
as part of their misguided attempts to formulate logics that exclude all paradoxes of
implication. However, as we have seen, disjunctive syllogism has been slandered. It is
associated only with the illusory paradoxes of implication, and it is independent of the
genuine paradoxes of implication. This consideration alone, to remove a major cost
that comes with no corresponding benefit, is a reason to switch from R to KR as the
right classification of logically valid arguments.
In addition, Burgess and others have argued that there are connections between
entailment and practical rules that can underwrite an argument for disjunctive syllo-
gism being included in any acceptable logic and the Harman point does not touch
50 Again, in R (and in KR), (PP) and (NP) are logically equivalent, even though one is illusory and one is
genuine according to the (Restall). Hence, one would need a logic that is fundamentally different from KR
if one wanted a logic that excludes all and only the genuine paradoxes of material implication.
51 Dunn and Restall (2002: p. 30).
52 Dunn and Restall (2002: p. 32).
53 Mares (2004: pp. 176–177).
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these connections.54 For example, for each implication there is a rule of mathematical
proof—e.g., associated with modus ponens is the rule of proof that one may conclude
B from premises A → B and A in a deductive argument. And the contrary holds as
well. We know from examples like those in Burgess’s paper that it is a rule of deductive
argumentation that one may conclude B from premises ¬A and A ∨ B. Thus, disjunc-
tive syllogism is an implication. Moreover, disjunctive syllogism is an implication
involving only logical sentential connectives. Therefore, it should be included in any
acceptable logic. I think that is what Burgess’s arguments show, and that is why KR
is superior to any relevant logic.55
Here is an objection: relevant logics have been championed as the most familiar
logics that have the variable sharing property (e.g., antecedents and consequents of
conditional theorems share a sentential variable). This property is sometimes men-
tioned in the same context as a related property: the premise use property (i.e., all the
premises are used to derive the conclusion in valid arguments).56 However, KR loses
both features. That seems to be a problem.
The variable sharing property and the criterion of premise use are good measures
of relevance, but we already know that they are not sufficient for good arguments. No
one thinks A  A is a good argument for A, even though it is valid on most relevance
logics. It should not be shocking that they might not necessary either, especially when
one sees the cost of accepting them (e.g., DS).57
The entailments picked out by relevant considerations do pick out interesting pat-
terns of use. However, there are patterns of use that correspond to entailments that are
not picked out by relevant considerations. In short, the case for KR being the right
logic is ipso facto the case against variable sharing or premise use being a necessary
condition for good arguments.
Now we move on to showing that there is no good argument for excluding dis-
junctive syllogism, or, at least, many of the popular arguments are not good. Relevant
logicians have long argued that there is something wrong with disjunctive syllogism,
or that they can provide some kind of substitute for it, or that it can be added without
trouble to various relevant logics. If correct, these considerations would undermine
one of the central arguments of this defence of KR. What are we to make of them?
First, consider some arguments that disjunctive syllogism should be excluded from
any acceptable logic. One well-known argument of this kind comes from Jay Garfield,
who claims that disjunctive syllogism can lead one astray if one is reasoning from
misleading information. For example, I believe something false, but for good reason,
like the proposition that the Earth is only 6000 years old, and I use disjunction intro-
54 See also Burgess (1981, 1983, 1984, 2005), Mortensen (1983, 1986), Read (1983), and Tennant (2005)
for discussion.
55 Also motivated by the importance of disjunctive syllogism in various forms of reasoning, Tennant (2017)
defends a substructural relevant logic—core logic—by rejecting unrestricted transitivity in an effort to keep
disjunctive syllogism without the paradoxes of implication. Tennant’s systems deserve their own comparison
with KR, but this is beyond the scope of the paper.
56 Note that relevant logicians diverge on how to define ‘variable sharing’. For example Read (1989) and
Mares (2014) explicitly include premise use as part of variable sharing, but Méndez and Robles (2012) does
not.
57 See Tennant (2015) for discussion of variable sharing and options for relevant logics.
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duction to arrive at a disjunction with two false disjuncts like the following: the Earth
is only 6000 years old or climate change is a hoax. Later, my initial false belief is
corrected so that I now believe that the Earth is not only 6000 years old. If I now
use disjunctive syllogism, I arrive at the false belief that climate change is a hoax.58
Disjunctive syllogism has led me astray.
However, as Mares argues, the point is not specific to disjunctive syllogism. If one
begins with false beliefs, no matter how well justified, any inference rule can lead
one to other false beliefs, even after the initial belief has been corrected.59 There is
no reason to think that disjunctive syllogism is somehow singled out by Garfield’s
considerations.
Another attempt to show that disjunctive syllogism should be rejected because it
can lead one astray comes from S. V. Bhave, who argues that in situations involving
some kind of indeterminacy, disjunctive syllogism can take one from true premises to
a false conclusion. If one allows sentences to have truth values other than truth and
falsity (indicating some kind of indeterminacy), and one defines negation so that a
sentence and its negation might each be true, then an instance of disjunctive syllogism
can take one from a true sentence p together with a true disjunction (whose disjuncts
are p’s negation and some false sentence q), to a false conclusion q.60 But the problem
here should be obvious—the “counterexample” to disjunctive syllogism depends on
reinterpreting negation so that a sentence and its negation can each be true.
Mares argues that disjunctive syllogism is unacceptable when reasoning about cer-
tain inconsistent fictions. Following a short story in which Jones inherits an estate and
does not inherit an estate, Mares writes, “It seems we need situations in which it is
both true that Jones inherits the estate and Jones does not inherit the estate. From this
we would hardly want to infer that Jones hates ice cream. But we could do so if we
are allowed disjunctive syllogism. … So it seems that we should reject disjunctive
syllogism as a rule of inference.” The problem with this argument is, again, that it
conflates inference and implication—it is inconsistent with the Harman point. Mares
claims that the argument from ‘Jones inherits the estate’ and ‘Jones does not inherit
the estate’ to ‘Jones hates ice cream’ is intuitively unacceptable—people should not
infer in this way. Thus, he concludes, the implication involved should be excluded
from any acceptable logic. That is exactly the kind of argument we have seen again
and again from relevant logicians, and it is one that is undermined by the Harman
point. The move from ‘such and such inference is unacceptable’ to ‘such and such
implication is unacceptable’ is illegitimate.
Instead of arguing that disjunctive syllogism should be rejected, some relevant
logicians argue that we can make due with something other than disjunctive syllogism.
For example, Read claims that there are some cases that appear as if someone is using
disjunctive syllogism when they are in fact using intensional disjunctive syllogism.
Intensional disjunctive syllogism is a rule governing a special connective call fission,
⊕, which is defined as: p ⊕ q df ¬ p → q. Intensional disjunctive syllogism says that
58 Garfield (1990).
59 Mares (2004: pp. 177–178).
60 Bhave (1997: p. 402).
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q follows from ¬p and p ⊕ q. Given the definition of fission, intensional disjunctive
syllogism is just a version of modus ponens.61
The problem with Read’s suggestion is that he provides no evidence that we dis-
tinguish between something like disjunction and something like fission in natural
language. The famous Lewis argument, for example, would contain an equivocation
according to Read. That is, in the following deduction,
1. A ∧ ¬A Assumption
2. A 1, ∧E
3. A ∨ B 2, ∨I
4. ¬A 1, ∧E
5. B 3,4, DS
the formula on line 3 is, according to Read, ambiguous because the disjunction can be
read as a normal extensional disjunction or as a fission. If it is extensional disjunction,
then the transition to line 5 is unacceptable to the relevant logician, and if it is fission,
then the transition to line 3 is unacceptable. Either way, the argument is invalid. But
Read provides no evidence that there is even an ambiguity here. His proposal is that
there is this connective that obeys something like disjunctive syllogism that can be
defined in a relevant logic. But this proposal does nothing to quiet the worry that
people have about disjunctive syllogism as an inference rule pertaining to extensional
disjunction.
Another attempt like Read’s is to interpret disjunctive syllogism as a pragmatic rule:
if one accepts p ∨ q, and one accepts ¬p, then one should accept q. Mares suggests
that this rule follows from three others:
PDS: if one accepts p ∨ q, and rejects p, then one should accept q.
PDS′: if one rejects p ∧ q, and accepts p, then one should reject q.
Contra: one should reject any contradiction.
From these we can reason in the following way: someone who accepts a disjunction
A ∨ B and a negation, ¬A, should reject the contradiction A ∧ ¬A (by Contra), and
so should reject A (by PDS′), and so should accept B (by PDS).62 However, there
are several reasons to think that this pragmatic proposal is inadequate. First, Mares’
pragmatic rules PDS and PDS′ are false as shown in the discussion of the Harman
point in Sect. 2.2. For example, it is false that if one accepts a disjunction and rejects
one of its disjuncts then one should accept the other disjunct. In a situation where the
agent, say, already rejects both disjuncts, the rule councils the agent to do something
irrational—i.e., accept inconsistent claims. Instead, an agent in this situation should
revise his or her acceptances and rejections, and logic has little to say about how the
agent should go about this task. Therefore, Mares’ pragmatic version of disjunctive
syllogism runs afoul of the Harman point again.
Finally, relevant logicians have devoted plenty of energy to showing that disjunctive
syllogism is admissible in various relevant logics. Why are these results not good
enough to satisfy those who want to use disjunctive syllogism? The answer is that these
61 Read (1982).
62 Mares (2004: pp. 184–186).
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logicians are not talking about whether disjunctive syllogism is valid. For example, in
two of the most recent such publications, Robles and Méndez provide a semantics for
a particular relevant logic that shows disjunctive syllogism is admissible.63 However,
‘admissible’ is a term of art that is distinct from having disjunctive syllogism as an
inference rule or axiom. Instead, they are referring to the rule: if  A and  ¬ A ∨ B,
then  B. This rule is not disjunctive syllogism. The fact is that neither the inference
rule of disjunctive syllogism (i.e., A ∧ (¬A ∨ B)  B) nor the axiom of material
disjunctive syllogism (i.e.,  A ∧ (¬A ∨ B) → B) is logically valid in any relevant
logic.
In sum, the major unsolved problem with every relevant logic is that they exclude
disjunctive syllogism—if any relevant logic is correct, then disjunctive syllogism is
invalid. There are, however, good reasons to think that disjunctive syllogism is valid and
should be included in any acceptable logic. Proponents of relevant logics have not been
able to identify anything problematic about disjunctive syllogism that distinguishes
it from other inference rules, and none of their alternatives to disjunctive syllogism
are workable. In short, disjunctive syllogism is as good an inference rule as modus
ponens or any of the others. There is no reason to exclude it from an acceptable logic,
and there is no reason to think that its role can be filled by something else.
One final objection: some logics other than KR include disjunctive syllogism and
exclude the genuine paradoxes of implication (e.g., Ackermann’s systems ’ and
”).64 Why is KR better than them?
My reply is: yes, this plea for KR is also a plea for any other logic that in this
category. Is that a problem? If I were arguing for KR as the only legitimate logic
instead of offering a plea for KR, then it would be. I do think KR has other virtues as
well, and these support it over other logics in this category, but these considerations
go beyond what is required for a successful plea.
6 Conclusion
The preceding considerations constitute a plea for the logic KR. It should be part of
the vast conversation about what is (or are) the right logic(s). Logicians today are
arguing for a bewildering array of logics.65 Surely there is a place for a logic that has a
somewhat more relevant conditional than classical logic but avoids what is undisputed
as the biggest problem facing relevance logics.
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